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The architects of the US Army's future face an experience which in many ways parallels that of a century ago.
Today's force designers, like those at the last turn of the century, must wade through a sea of futuristic materials, some
fantastic, some prescient, to make projections about future geopolitical environments and military-technological
capabilities. Given the right political circumstances, the proliferation of off-the-shelf warfighting technologies may
produce a destabilizing effect resembling the one generated by the arms race between the Central and Entente powers
before the Great War.[1] The need to cross the deadly zone quickly and decisively forms, as it did a hundred years
ago, the central tactical-technological issue for current military theory--each case involves an increase in battlefield
lethality and the sudden emergence of additional warfighting dimensions.[2] Like the 19th-century's militarytechnological entrepreneurs, today's technology salesmen predict that future units will have at least three to five times
the firepower of current ones, and thus can afford to be smaller in size and fewer in number. The Army and its sister
services face budgetary, doctrinal, and proponency battles comparable to those that nearly stymied force modernization
in several nations at the beginning of the 20th century. Moreover, like the Second Industrial Revolution at the turn of
the last century, the rapidly unfolding Information Age has produced diverse primary, supporting, and enabling
technologies requiring investment, testing, and evaluation.
Accordingly, future-oriented initiatives like the Force XXI and Army After Next projects, which probe likely changes
in the character of warfare out to 2025, would gain much from an accurate understanding of why similar efforts a
hundred years ago missed their mark. Conventional wisdom maintains that military thinking is inherently conservative
and more concerned with refighting the last war than preparing for the next. In the case of 1914, for instance, the
supposed failures of military thinking have become almost legendary. Late-19th-century military theorists, "ignorant
and suspicious of all the great advances in firearms," stubbornly clung to "outmoded tactical conceptions" reflecting
the "old aspirations and ideals of a defunct social class." Fortunately, amateur theorists, open-minded and full of
practical sense, saved the military mind from itself--or so the story goes.[3]
History demonstrates that ignorance, suspicion, and stubbornness have played a role in every era and in every human
endeavor: They are hardly unique to the military mind. Identifying these human characteristics as the most important
reason for the "failure" of pre-1914 military thinking overlooks the part played by other, and in this case more
significant, forces. Such caricatures of the past limit what we might learn from history. This article argues that the
conventional view of military-technological change in the pre-World War I era overlooks the manner in which the
dynamics of technological change--in terms of its rate, scope, and nonlinear nature--exacerbated the difficulties of
integrating new technologies into European and American military structures. It also discusses the implications of
those dynamics for Assumption-Based Planning, a tool with the potential to help the US Army conduct long-range
planning in uncertain times.
Visions of Future War: The Professional
When we actually look at the historical evidence, the military professional's vision of future war at the last turn of the
century proves to have been much more forward-looking than the conventional wisdom allows. Military theorists of
the day clearly recognized that new technologies in the form of railroads, wireless telegraphy, telephone networks,
smokeless powder, magazine-fed rifles, self-powered machine guns, quick-firing artillery, and aircraft had irreversibly
altered the conduct of war.[4] The many after-action reports and official histories written about wars that occurred

between 1870 and 1914, along with countless other professional books and journals, acknowledged that the range,
accuracy, and rate of fire of contemporary weaponry had expanded the deadly zone to 1000 meters or more, and would
very likely prohibit attacks over unbroken ground.[5] Numerous theorists predicted that land battles would resemble
the sieges of old rather than the free-wheeling engagements of Napoleon's or Moltke's day. "Million-man" armies
would take the field, severely taxing the coordinating capacities of commanders and their staffs, even with the aid of
revolutionary communications technologies. Future battles would also occupy a new warfighting dimension, the air.[6]
The increased lethality of the modern battlefield made it nearly impossible for an attacker to close with the defender
and defeat him in battle.
Indeed, crossing the deadly zone became the tactical problem of the day, and military theorists in Britain, France,
Germany, and the United States spared no effort in attempting to solve it.[7] If this problem remained unsolved,
decisive victory would vanish from the military lexicon and warfare would become nothing more than an exercise in
attrition. Such an outcome represented either a failure of arms or an absence of military genius, each equally
unacceptable to the military professional. Proposed solutions to the crisis assumed many forms. Fundamentally,
however, military theorists believed that achieving fire superiority at the decisive point would allow the attacker to
overwhelm the defender and restore mobility to the battlefield.[8] The pre-WWI infantry drill regulations of Britain,
France, Germany, and the United States reflected this belief by advocating attacks with small, open-order formations,
advancing in short rushes under cover and concealment, followed by the concentration of all available direct and
indirect firepower at the decisive point to weaken the enemy before the final assault.[9]
Although pre-1914 military thought certainly had its share of ignorance, suspicion, and stubbornness, it appreciated
quite well the advantages that modern weapons technology afforded the defender. It foresaw the potential stalemate of
trench warfare and the probable carnage of "no man's land" and attempted to avoid them. However, it made an
apparently logical but ultimately erroneous assumption: that achieving fire superiority (i.e., employing superior
firepower technology) would suffice to avoid a stalemate on the battlefield.[10] The emphasis that some military
theorists placed on the morale element as a means to overcome material superiority must be viewed as a counterweight
to the enthusiasm that the era often exhibited toward technological solutions.[11] As a result of its assumption that fire
superiority would enable the attacker to cross the deadly zone, turn-of-the-century military theory did not fully develop
alternative operational-level maneuver technologies capable of dealing with a defense in depth and of exploiting a
breakthrough once achieved. Without recourse to either large-scale, live-fire maneuvers or the test of battle--the only
proving grounds truly acknowledged by soldiers--military theory alone could not solve what by 1907 had become a
general crisis in warfighting.[12] Military theory could approach the tactical problem of the day only on an abstract
level.
Visions of Future War: The Amateur
Contrary to the myth that nonprofessionals saved the military mind from itself, amateur visions of future war, though
originating "outside the box," often reflected errors in fact or logic which made them questionable or even dangerous.
Celebrated amateur theorists such as Ivan Bloch (1836-1902), a Polish banker and writer, produced a vision of war
that actually differed little from the one forecast by military professionals. Bloch claimed that the next war would
become a stalemate of huge proportions with armies fully entrenched, unable to advance, the spade as indispensable to
the soldier as the rifle, and victory forever beyond reach. However, Bloch departed from the vision of the military
professionals in one key respect--his prediction that war itself would cease because states could no longer use it as a
rational political instrument.[13] In the eyes of the period's military men, Bloch failed to understand that irrational
forces, like basic enmity, nationalistic passion, or religious zeal, would continue to cause wars, regardless of rational
influences to the contrary.
In another example, H. G. Wells (1866-1945), reputedly one of the most forward-thinking individuals of the fin de
siècle, failed to recognize the revolutionary potential of the wireless. He also predicted that submarines would do little
more than suffocate their crews and founder at sea. In 1902, barely a year before the Kitty Hawk flight, he declared
that airplanes would not fly until about 1950; nor did he believe that they would affect transportation in any significant
way.[14] In the meantime, other amateurs prognosticated about the nature of air power at the turn of the century and
how it would render war on land obsolete.[15]

Reflecting still more the unbridled imagination of the nonprofessional, popular journals and magazines like Punch,
Strand, and Blackwood's in Britain, La Caricature in France, and Kladderadatsch in Germany featured stories by
famous authors like Sir Arthur Conan Doyle (1859-1930), A. A. Milne (1882-1956), and Jack London (1876-1916).
Their tales described fantastic dynamite cruisers, electric rifles, compressed air carbines, mobile armored artillery
bases, flying fortifications, underwater sleds, protective fogs, exotic chemicals and diseases, corrosive dewdrops,
human mind-benders, and brain-disrupting psychic mediums.[16] Many of these ideas were simply too far ahead of
their time to be of use to professionals worried about a general war breaking out in the next two or three years. Other
ideas would simply never see their day. This is not to say, however, that amateurs had nothing worthwhile to offer to
professionals. On the contrary, cooperation between the two occurred on a large scale, particularly in the field of
aeronautics, and their ideas and visions of future war co-evolved.
The Dynamics of Technological Change
Although ignorance, suspicion, and stubbornness played a part in the development of both military and civilian visions
of future war, their role pales in comparison to that played by the rate, scope, and nonlinear nature of change. The rate
of technological change itself exceeded anything Western society had hitherto experienced. In 1908, only 142,000
motorized vehicles cruised the roads of Europe and North America. By 1913, this number had increased more than
tenfold, to 1.5 million. Similarly, within five years of the Wright brothers' first flight at Kitty Hawk, Europe and the
United States had established over 130 aeronautical records.[17] Likewise, the rate of military-technological change
accelerated dramatically in the last quarter of the 19th century.[18] Western armies completed twice as many doctrinal
revisions in this period than they had in the previous 75 years.[19] Admittedly, many of these revisions were minor,
reflecting more a desire to refine rather than to reinvent. Nonetheless, by the turn of the century, military regulations
were being reviewed for pertinence more often than ever before.
In response to such rapid change, Western society developed a new infrastructure for testing, evaluating, and
integrating the flood of technological innovations that inundated it. Technological assessment required the creation of
new organizations or the reorganization of existing ones--difficult processes in their own right. These new bureaus
often had to conduct their tests and evaluations without the benefit of any experience or precedent. Once selected, a
specific technology required staffing to determine its appropriate quantity, organization, distribution, and doctrine.
These decisions, in turn, depended upon the pace and extent of other modernization efforts within the organization as a
whole, such as the major expansion and revision of the US Army's force structure that occurred between 1899 and
1904. Consequently, the rate of technological innovation soon outpaced the still nascent process of integration. Put
another way, the rate of technological change often got "inside" bureaucratic decision cycles and created nearly
unbridgeable gaps between theory and practice.
Second, this era, this first great age of the future, witnessed an unprecedented scope of technological change that
reached into every facet of modern life. Revolutionary inventions like the typewriter, the phonograph, the motionpicture camera, the telephone, the wireless, the transoceanic cable, the bicycle, the automobile, the airplane, the electric
street car, and the subway irreversibly changed the way in which Western society pursued its business and leisure
activities.[20] This Second Industrial Revolution gave rise to an infinite variety of new industries, reshaped existing
ones, and left in its wake a series of vast urban centers and transportation networks. Between 1890 and 1913, for
example, Germany's population increased by 36 percent (from 49.2 million to 66.9 million); between 1896 and 1913 its
national income rose by 85 percent (from 23.5 billion marks to 43.5 billion), and its per capita income by 43 percent
(from 450 marks to 645 marks).[21] By 1900, Britain, Germany, and the United States together accounted for 67
percent of the world's industrial output. Such vast economic changes also transformed European social structures,
resulting in, among other things, a greater presence of commoners and members of the up-and-coming middle classes
in the formerly aristocratic officer ranks of European armies.[22]
Culturally, the pervasiveness of technological change produced a profound tension between optimism and anxiety. On
the one hand, progress brought an increase in knowledge and education, significant prosperity and wealth, modern
conveniences, and welcome advances in the medical sciences. On the other hand, its relentless and irreverent march
forward destroyed long-standing religious and cultural icons, challenged the political status quo, and supported a revolt
against past beliefs and codes of conduct. The scope of technological change thus set in motion a complex series of
unanticipated events, problems, and consequences, which turn-of-the-century civilians and soldiers had to confront as

neophytes.[23]
Third, the technological innovations that flooded Western society at the turn of the century did not develop in an
autonomous, linear, and predictable manner, but in a nonlinear way, that is, interdependently, unevenly, and contrary
to expectation. The success of a complete system depended upon the timely advance and integration of its supporting
and enabling technologies. For example, the US Army's selection of a standard machine gun between 1901 and 1904
depended upon the development of a new service rifle (M1903), the caliber of its ammunition at the Springfield
Armory, and the testing of ancillary equipment related to the weapon's handling, transport, and storage.[24] Small
changes in supporting technologies--often easily overlooked--sometimes proved as revolutionary as the advent of
whole systems. A series of minor improvements in traverse-and-elevation mechanisms, metal-cased and cleaner-firing
ammunition, and broader-vision field glasses for spotting the weapon's fall of shot combined to make the machine gun
even more lethal at longer ranges than expected. Likewise, unanticipated discoveries in apparently minor and unrelated
fields repeatedly--and sometimes decisively--deflected the expected trajectory of technological change. The advent of
inexpensive steel plate combined fortuitously with the new "hardening processes" of the 1890s to upset the global
status quo: It enabled Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States to emerge as significant naval powers in less than
25 years.[25] Thus, the nonlinear nature of technological change consistently surprised conservative and visionary
alike by producing complex and often disproportionate effects.[26]
Implications for Planning in Uncertain Times
The dynamics of technological change served not only to unhinge expectations of the future but to perplex the process
of technological integration at the turn of the century. Today, similarly, advances in chemical and genetic engineering,
propulsion technologies, composite materials, and information and simulation systems create challenges for soldiers
and civilians about to enter the 21st century. As it did a hundred years ago, technological change will likely transpire
incrementally and imperceptibly in some cases, abruptly and dramatically in others. New discoveries or experiments in
any number of diverse scientific and technological fields may render obsolete initiatives already in development. To
face such challenges, the US Army must reconsider the way it plans for the future.
One key component in that approach is the Assumption-Based Planning (ABP) tool, an instrument for long-range
planning developed by the RAND Corporation which has gained currency in recent years.[27] ABP involves five
steps:
Identify the explicit and implicit assumptions expected to remain true over a reasonable time horizon.
Identify assumption vulnerabilities.
Define "signposts" that will indicate when one or more assumptions have become vulnerable.
Define appropriate "shaping" actions that avoid assumption vulnerabilities.
Define "hedging" actions that minimize the effects of an assumption failure.
Although it does not claim to be a panacea, ABP does offer a much improved alternative to trends-based forms of
planning which posit only a single, "most likely" future.[28] Most important, ABP helps expose organizational
assumptions that might prove invalid, and therefore dangerous, to a long-range plan in a given period of time. Its
success depends on the ability of decisionmakers to link their implicit and explicit assumptions to events in the
physical world.
Applying ABP effectively in a fluid technological environment like the one that confronted pre-1914 military thinkers,
however, requires that users understand the tool's limitations. The first of these involves the sensitivity of human
perceptions. ABP requires the identification of "genuine and unambiguous signposts."[29] Yet, in fluid environments,
signposts are myriad, conflicting, and at times almost invisible. For example, in the United States alone, more than
3000 different makes of cars appeared around the turn of the century. These diverse models and prototypes were
produced by some 1500 firms, most of which would fall into bankruptcy and disappear before the Great War, a
reflection of the uncertainty of the times. Of the three general engine systems available to propel these vehicles, the
gas-powered, internal combustion engine seemed the least promising because it required a very complex transmission,
was expensive and noisy, and had the psychological disadvantage, as one contemporary manufacturer explained, of
forcing people to "sit over an explosion."[30] The electric car, on the other hand, had none of these problems, but its

battery prevented it from operating at high speeds and over long distances. Signs indicated, in fact, that the steampowered vehicle would dominate the market, since it ran more cleanly and quietly and proved more powerful than the
other two. Yet, due to a "historical accident" which remains something of a mystery, the steam-driven automobile
suddenly declined in popularity and the gasoline engine became the industry standard.[31]
The appreciation of signposts often eluded even those who had spent their lives working on a particular project or
invention. James Prescott Joule (1818-1889) was the inventor of one of the first electromagnetic engines. Nonetheless,
he failed to recognize the vast potential of electricity as an energy source, even though it would eventually
revolutionize all forms of industry.[32] Compounding the problem of perception, inventors or entrepreneurs often
generated misinformation, inadvertently and otherwise, about the potential benefits of a new kind of technology. A
notorious weapons dealer by the name of Basil Zaharoff several times wrecked the European trials of Maxim's
machine gun through lies, bribery, and sabotage. Richard Gatling (1818-1903) naively marketed his famous gun as "a
great economy" that would save the US Army men and money. Two gatlings--at a cost of $1,500 each--were
presumably enough to replace an entire infantry regiment--costing in excess of $150,000 per year to maintain.[33]
However, as events were to prove, the dynamics of combat generated demands for more of everything--machine guns,
munitions, and soldiers.[34]
In fact, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the Boer War of 1899-1902, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05
delivered no "genuine and unambiguous" signposts to indicate that the fundamental assumptions of military theorists
had become vulnerable. As the many after-action and observer reports indicated, differences in terrain, equipment,
training, doctrine, leadership, morale, and "racial characteristics" served to obscure the genuine lessons or signposts
that these wars had to offer. Since the Japanese managed to execute numerous successful attacks when they
coordinated them with sufficient heavy artillery and machine gun support, the three major assumptions that guided
turn-of-the-century military thought did not appear vulnerable: the deadly zone has grown larger and more lethal
(explicit); well-directed firepower may make it possible to cross the deadly zone (explicit); and armies must cross the
deadly zone to achieve decisive victory (implicit).[35] These assumptions appeared to remain valid well into the first
eight weeks of the Great War on the Western Front, and even longer on the Eastern Front.[36]
In addition to the very real problem of signpost detection and perception, ABP depends upon the accurate
identification of explicit and implicit assumptions likely to prove vulnerable over a given period of time. However, the
identification of assumptions is at best a solipsistic process. In other words, our ability to recognize the assumptions
that guide our thinking is limited by our willingness to perform a rigorous self-critical analysis. Turn-of-the-century
armies developed their tactics not only with an eye on the effects of improvements in weapon technologies, but also
with an appreciation for what they called the "national character" of their soldiers. The French army accepted a casual
state of indiscipline within its ranks to preserve "souplesse"--mental agility and initiative--and because it believed that
Frenchmen did not respond well in a rigidly structured environment.[37] The German army, on the other hand, placed
a higher premium on drill and discipline in order to promote responsiveness and endurance in personnel whom it
deemed lacked a "natural talent" for them.[38] Hence, there is a danger that the identification of explicit and implicit
assumptions may not proceed much beyond a similar type-casting of oneself and one's opponents.
Third, the shaping and hedging actions so integral to ABP methodology will likely compete for the same finite
resources; one action might preempt the success of another. Shaping actions designed to assist infantry in crossing the
deadly zone began almost as soon as the problem emerged in the mid-19th century. These shaping actions propelled
improvements in firepower technologies, especially cannons, munitions, and powder, so that by 1897 the French army
had developed a highly effective 75mm cannon with a recoil mechanism that allowed an unheard of rate of fire--20 to
30 rounds per minute. By 1905, all major European armies possessed some version of a quick-firing gun comparable
to the French 75mm. By 1914, cannons had increased dramatically in number and caliber; howitzers of 105mm and
150mm were standard in the German army.[39] However, the resources required for the development of firepower
technology left little opportunity for resourcing alternative maneuver technologies, an important but underdeveloped
hedging action.
In a world of limited budgets, therefore, armies will have to prioritize resources for shaping and hedging actions, an
activity that might complicate, if not compromise, long-range planning. This was clearly the case with turn-of-thecentury armies, which had insufficient resources for modernization given the rate and scope of technological

innovation they experienced. In fact, every army encountered frustrating budgetary battles within its respective
parliamentary or congressional processes. In one case, Colonel Erich Ludendorff, head of the German General Staff's
Mobilization Section in 1912, was summarily posted to a regimental command after demanding a budgetary increase
that would have authorized an additional 300,000 recruits for the Imperial German Army over the course of two
years.[40] Hence, the right vision of future war may not matter if the processes for achieving technological integration
remain inflexible and unresponsive to those signposts that are in fact recognized. In addition to correctly identifying
the measures necessary for military victory, therefore, force designers must possess the ability to clarify and justify
military necessities to legislators. Soldierly inspiration may avail little without the corresponding ability to persuade.
Fourth, in an environment in which technological change may take place "inside" institutional decision or adjustment
cycles, hedging actions--while appearing to remedy vulnerable assumptions--may only further reduce the overall pace
of technological integration. ABP will not eliminate the risks that decisionmakers face as they attempt to determine the
"right" pace of modernization for the Army. In the decades before World War I, the German General Staff and the
German War Ministry battled extensively over the proper size of the army. The former wanted a larger army to meet
operational requirements brought about by rapid changes in warfare and mobilization schedules. The latter preferred
quality over quantity and insisted on maintaining a smaller force to preserve homogeneity and political reliability. The
compromise that occurred with the German army bill of 1912-13 satisfied neither party.[41]
As pointed out in Knowledge & Speed, the US Army's 1997 report of the Army After Next project, changing too
quickly will likely result in the acquisition of "immature or inappropriate capabilities" or even undermine the
"doctrinal organization or cohesion" essential to an army.[42] Modernizing too slowly, on the other hand, runs the risk
of fielding a force with outclassed and therefore restricted capabilities. Finding the right "slope" of change will likely
require a blend of experience and intuition.
The point of airing these concerns is to emphasize that ABP is merely a tool. Indeed, it constitutes only one pillar in
the effort to achieve timely and effective technological integration. Human resources and the integration process each
play decisive roles in the activity of building the future. Weaknesses among any of these roles, especially in an
environment in which change is rapid, pervasive, and nonlinear, may compromise the overall effort. The value of a
tool like ABP depends upon how well it compensates for human limitations within a particular environment. For this
reason, we must make our human resources as capable as possible by educating ourselves about the dynamics of
technological change and by "hedging" the assumption that change will proceed at a reasonable pace, within discrete
fields, and in a linear manner. In addition, we must make our integration processes as responsive as possible to rapid,
broad, and nonlinear change. Finally, we must continue to refine ABP and any other planning tools we develop.
General Recommendations
Formal planning tools like Assumption-Based Planning offer no "silver bullets" to prevent the unhinging effects of
rapid, pervasive, nonlinear change. Decisionmaking in fluid conditions will likely remain more art than science.
However, the following recommendations may serve to both "shape" and "hedge" the Army's efforts to prepare for
military operations in the 21st century:
Continue to study the dynamics of technological change. Revise ABP as our understanding of the dynamics of
technological change improves.
Revamp DOD acquisition and procurement processes to accommodate such change. Ensure that such processes
remain streamlined, flexible, and capable of establishing resource priorities between shaping and hedging
actions.
Maintain a "push-pull" approach for incorporating technological innovations into operational concepts.
Operational concepts drive technology toward desired end-states, while technology offers new capabilities-actual and potential--that might enlarge, cancel, or otherwise alter operational concepts.
Genuine intuition and experienced judgment may prove just as valuable as formal decisionmaking tools, perhaps
even more so. Commit more resources to understanding the vital role that these factors play in decisionmaking.
Emphasize thorough research and rigorous analysis throughout the various stages of officer education. Develop
an officer corps capable of preparing and presenting credible and convincing arguments for force modernization
to appropriate lawmakers.

Foster a military culture that is open to change and supports the development of broad visions of the future.
Officer experience and education must remain equal to the challenges of maintaining competence in a broad
variety of fields while achieving mastery in select specialties.
As Army XXI and Army After Next set the Army's course for the next 30 years, they do so with the understanding that
technological change occurs in a complex and dynamic manner. Appreciating its pitfalls and opportunities requires the
right blend of formalism and intuitive insight.
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